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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.
NATURE OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondent/Cross-Appellant,
referred to as

Susan Carol Olson,

hereinafter

"Susan," and Appellant/Cross-Respondent,

Marvin

Raynell Montoya, hereinafter referred to as "Marvin" were married
on January 12, 2001.

During the marriage,

minor childre~,

the parties had two

and

both born on
On February 7,
Divorce.
(R.

2006,

(R. pp. 12-16).

pp. 17-23).

the parties'

Susan filed a Verified Complaint for
Marvin filed an Answer and Counterclaim.

Both parties sought primary physical custody of

children and child support in accordance with the

Idaho Child Support Guidelines.
While the divorce action was pending, Susan filed a Motion for
Temporary Support and a hearing was held on March 27, 2006.
p .1,

L.

4 -

p.

18, L.

6) .

(Tr.

The magistrate issued an Order for

Temporary Support based upon Marvin's representation of his income
despite a showing by Susan of Marvin's historical income.

Also

while the divorce action was pending, Marvin filed several pretrial motions.

Based upon a

stipulation reached between the parties,

the

Court entered a Partial Judgment and Decree on May 16, 2006, which
resolved the property issues in the case.

(R. pp. 24-27) .

On the morning of trial, the parties stipulated to a parenting
schedule, which was memorialized in a Partial Judgment and Decree
entered on October 10, 2006.

(R. pp. 28-33).

Thus, at trial on

September 12, 2006, the magistrate only heard evidence regarding
the parties'

re spec ti ve incomes for child support purposes and

whether Susan should be awarded costs and attorney fees.
19, L. 4 - p. 193, L. 10).

(Tr. p.

The magistrate entered its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on December 7, 2006, and the
Final Judgment and Decree of Divorce on January 10, 2007.
36-51).

(R. pp.

(R. pp. 52-62).

Susan

appealed

to

the

district

court

arguing

that

the

magistrate erred in calculating Marvin's income for purposes of
establishing child support by ignoring or misconstruing evidence of
Marvin's income as presented at trial.

(R. pp.

63-66) .

Susan

further argued that the magistrate failed to review the income and
expenses from Marvin's self-employment or the operation of his
business, thereby ignoring over $130,000 of Marvin's income.
pp. 63-66).

Finally, Susan argued that she is entitled to costs

and attorney fees at trial and on appeal .

..................... ,

.,.....,.,...._.,.,.

(R.

_____ ... ---- - _.......... - -----

The appeal to the district court was heard by the Honorable D.
Duff McKee.

The district court "issued a

Memorandum Decision

vacating the magistrate's findings on child support and remanding
the case to the magistrate to make appropriate findings consistent
with the district court's decision.

(R. pp. 67-71).

On the issue of costs and attorney fees, the district court
awarded Susan costs and stated, "[n]o attorney fees at this stage;
the magistrate may consider the issue of attorney fees for the
entirety of the proceedings after remand."
magistrate

addressed the

instant appeal.

(R.

issues

on

(R.

remand,

p. 71).
Marvin

Before the
filed

this

pp. 72-74).

On January 29,

2008,

Susan filed a

Motion for

Costs

and

Attorney Fees at Trial, On Appeal to the District Court, and on
Appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court.

(Supp. R. pp. 13-19).

In her

motion, Susan argued in part that the disparity between her income
and that of Marvin's was significant and that she did not have the
financial resources for attorney fees in attempting to obtain a
proper child support award.

(Supp. R. p. 17).

Marvin objected.

(Supp. R. pp. 20-27).
After hearing arguments from both counsel,
denied Susan's motion.

(Supp. R. pp. 39-40).

of Cross-Appeal on May 22, 2008.

the magistrate

Susan filed a Notice

(Supp. R. pp. 41-43).

Susan then

requested, and was granted, an Order for direct permissive appeal.
(Supp. R. pp. 44-49).

B.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
During the marriage, Susan and Marvin had two minor children.
(R.

p.

29).

At the time of trial,

Susan was employed as the

director of administration at Hawley Troxell Ennis
(Tr. p. 53, L. 5 - L. 6).

&

Hawley, LLP.

Susan's salary for 2006 was $93,000 per

year, which included her b9nus.

(Tr. p. 32, L. 25 - p. 33, L. 18).

Marvin

the

was

Services,

self-employed

Inc.

("MS"),

and

owne,;r

of

MST Insurance Agency,

MS

Administrative

Inc.

Montoya Enterprises, LLC ("Montoya Enterprises").

("MST"),

and

(Tr. p. 84, L.

16 - L. 20).
During the pendency of the case,
Temporary Support.
counsel stated:

Susan filed a Motion for

At the hearing on Susan's motion, Marvin's

"I will represent to the court without testimony

that we would base Mr. Montoya's income on $136,140."
L. 22 - 24).

(Tr. p. 10,

Susan provided the magistrate with information from

the parties' 2005 tax return, indicating that Marvin's income was
$263,531 in 2005.

(Tr. p. 11, L. 13 - 17).

At the conclusion of

the hearing, the magistrate held:

the

I tend to look at child support early in
case by considering where the factual

issues lie, and there is obviously some
factual issues to decide regarding his income.
You're claiming it's 136. They're claiming it
could be as high as it is in 2005 which is
263, a substantial swing.
But I .tend to be
conservative about i t because of two reasons.
One is if it's proven to me later that income
was underestimated, underset, that he is
actually earning more, I do have the authority
to recalculate it and make any recalculation
retroactive. So, I tend to take the parties'
figures at face value of the way they
represent them.
(Tr. p.

13, L. 14 - p. 14, L. 1).

The magistrate then ordered

Marvin to pay to Susan temporary child support in the amount of
$1,243 per month beginning in April,

2006.

Additionally,

the

magistrate ordered the parties to pay their pro rata share of workrelated day care and medical insurance premiums for the children.
(Tr. p. 14, L. 3 - L. 16).
At trial, Susan presented evidence, based upon the parties'
tax returns, of Marvin's historical income, which averaged $338,629
for years 2005, 2004, and 2003.

See Exhibits 19,

48,

49,

and 2.

(Tr. p. 25, L. 23 - p. 27, L.22).
Susan indicated that she was

seeking a retroactive child support adjustment back to April of
2006.

( Tr . p . 2 7 , L . 2 5 - p . 2 8 , L . 2) .

Susan testified that

Marvin's apparent reduction in income was caused by Marvin using
his commissions to pay rent to his other company. (Tr. p. 28, L. 14
- p. 29, L. 9).

Susan presented evidence of a financial statement

created by Marvin, Exhibit 52A,

wherein Marvin stated that his

income as of August 11, 2005 was $398,000.

(Tr. p. 29, L. 10 -

p.30, L. 6).
At trial, Marvin testified that he received a salary from MS
in the amount of $109,800.

(Tr. p. 70, L. 20 - L. 21).

Marvin

testified that although he received a bonus in the past, that he
would not take a bonus in 2006.
counsel

then asked about

(Tr. p. 7, L. 3 - L. 7).

the commissions Marvin

Susan's

traditionally

received as follows:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:

Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

And your projected income from MST
before you pay it to rent for this
year is what?
I have no projected income from MST,
period.
What are your commission that you
receive? How much commissions have
you received so far from MST so far
this year?
I received no commissions from MST.
Where are those commission income
going?
There is income coming to MST, and
that income is going to MS.
What amount of income has come to
MST that's gone to MS?
I don' t know the exact numbers . The
accountant will testify to the exact
numbers that keeps records.
Well, i t is approximately 147 to
165,000?
It could be.
All right. And then, you take that
income when it comes into MS and you
pay it to Montoya Enterprises for
rent?
That's correct.
How much do you pay Montoya Enterprises from
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A:

that income for rent?
I'm not sure of the exact number.
You
can
get
that
from
the
accountant.
He handles all that,
but it's approximately 17 to 20,000
a month.

(Tr. p. 71, L. 8 - p. 72, L. 7).
Marvin testified that his total income for 2006 would be
$135,932,

consisting

of

his

salary

of

$109,080,

independent

commissions of $22,599, vehicle lease benefit of $1,378, gasoline
reimbursement of
$2,550.

$325,

and a . second vehicle

reimbursement

of

(Tr. p. 86, L. 21 - p. 87, L. 2).

Fernando Veloz, chief financial officer for MS, testified with
respect to commission income that,
. . . [T]he commission that's coming in to MST
Insurance Agency is basically - - because of
the closely held entities that these are, this
commission expense or income that's coming in
is actually going out and it's being paid to
MS
for
administrative
services.
This
administrative service, basically, is - - is,
in turn, being paid out as rent to - - on
behalf of MS to Montoya Enterprises.
(Tr. p.

126, L. 25 - p.

127, L.

company solely owned by Marvin.

7).

Montoya Enterprises is a

Mr. Veloz also testified that the

gross receipts or sales for MS were going to be higher in 2005 than
in previous years.

(Tr. p. 144, L. 21 - p. 147, L. 2).

The magistrate recognized the issue and stated, directing his
comments

to Marvin's counsel,

"[i] n

2005,

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - Page 7

your client claimed

$165,000 in commissions .

. . . Now, you're saying commissions are

zero, and rent has somehow increased.
has

increased.

I

don; t

understand how or why commission was

declared as income in 2005,
called rent."

I don't understand how rent

and it's not now.

It's now being

(Tr. p. 132, L. 6 - L. 12).

The magistrate issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and Order and concluded that Marvin was to pay to Susan child
support each month in the amount of $1,311.50.

(R. p. 44).

The

magistrate reached this conclusion by finding that "[t]he court is
persuaded

that

monies

generated by

MST

and MSA,

from

which

commissions were previously paid to Marvin, are required to be paid
to

[Montoya Enterprises]

as rent,

which,

in turn,

service the

mortgage and maintenance costs of operating an office building that
did not exist in prior years."

(R.

p.

43).

The magistrate

additionally refused to award Susan attorney fees indicating that
Susan "failed to demonstrate that she lacks sufficient income and
resources with which to pay her attorney's fees." (R. p. 42).
On appeal to the district court, Susan argued successfully
that the magistrate erred in determining the parties' respective
incomes for child support purposes by ignoring and/or misconstruing
evidence presented at trial.

Susan requested attorney fees and

costs on appeal pursuant to I.C.

§

12-121 and I.A.R.
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41.

The

district court vacated the magistrate's findings on child support
and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.

(R. p. 71).

The district court reviewed the magistrate's

findings and explained that the difference in the income levels
asserted by Susan and those asserted by Marvin "appears to be the
fact

that the husband completed construction of a

building.

new office

which was encumbered by a mortgage indebtedness of

$2,200,000."

(R. p. 68).

The district court further explained:

Apparently, the entity that now owns the
office
building
had,
in
prior
years,
distributed income to the community in the
form of commissions.
At the time of trial,
this entity was required to use the money for
debt service on the $2.2 million dollar
mortgage, and was not, therefore, able to
distribute commissions to the husband.
(R.

p. 68-69).

The district court recognized that Marvin paid significantly
less per month in rent for his businesses prior to trial compared
to the amount he was paying each month to service the mortgage on
his new building.

(R. p. 69).

Additionally, the district court

recognized that Marvin was paying the entirety of the expense of
the new building even though he was actually only using a portion
of it for his businesses.

(R.

p. 69).

The district court stated, "[w]hat is missing from the trial
court's analysis below is an evaluation of whether the new level of
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occupancy expense - - $20,000 per month instead of the much lower
figure -

was a

'necessary and reasonable'

impose on the business."

(R. p. 70) .

business expense to

The district court concluded

that money being paid in excess of that reasonable to Marvin's
businesses, or which reduces the debt and enhances Marvin's estate
(or net worth) should be considered as Marvin's income for child
support purposes.

(R. p.

71).

With respect to Susan's request for costs and attorney fees,
the district court awarded Susan costs and stated, "[n]o attorney
fees

at this

stage;

the magistrate may consider the issue of

attorney fees for the entirety of the proceedings after remand."
(R. p.

71).

Prior to

the magistrate addressing the issues on remand,

Marvin filed the instant appeal.
Susan filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees at Trial, On
Appeal to the District Court, and on Appeal to the Idaho Supreme
Court. (Supp. R. pp. 13-19) .

The magistrate denied Susan's motion.

(Supp.

Susan

R.

pp.

39-40).

magistrate's decision.

appealed

directly

from

the

II.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Marvin asserts that there are five issues on appeal:
1.

What is the role of the Memorandum Decision of the
district court in this appeal?

2.

Was the magistrate's award of child support a manifest
abuse of discretion?

3.

Did the magistrate consider all of the evidence before
him?

4.

Was Susan entitled to attorney fees?

5.

Marvin claims attorney fees in this appeal pursuant to
Idaho Code Section 12-121 and Idaho Appellate Rule 41.
Is he entitled to them?

Susan would restate the issues as follows:
1.

Whether the district court's memorandum decision should
be reviewed directly.

2.

Whether the district court erred in vacating the
findings of the magistrate on child support and
remanding for consideration of the district court's
decision.

3.

Whether the district court erred in deferring the issue
of attorney fees until after remand.

4.

Whether Marvin is entitled to costs and attorney fees

on appeal.
5.

Whether Susan is entitled to costs and attorney fees on
appeal.
III.
ISSUE PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL

1.

Whether the magistrate abused its discretion in
denying Susan's motion for attorney fees when the
attorney fees were incurred in an attempt to secure
proper child s~pport.
IV.
ARGUMENT

A.
GENERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Findings of fact made by the trial court will not be set
aside unless they are clearly erroneous.
689, 691, 800 P.2d 85, 87 (1990).

Rohr v. Rohr, 118 Idaho

Thus, any findings of fact

will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial and
competent evidence, even though such evidence may be conflicting.
Id.; Quiring v. Quiring, 130 Idaho 560, 563, 944 P.2d 695, 698

(1997).

Evidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable

trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining
whether a disputed point of fact had been proven.

In re

Williamson, 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 788 (2001).

Questions of law are reviewed on appeal freely.

B1iss v. B1iss,

127 Idaho.170, 172, 898 P.2d 1081, 1083 (1995).

A trial court's

findings under the Idaho Child Support Guidelines are reviewed
for substantial and competent evidence.

See Ire1and v. Ire1and,

123 Idaho 955, 855 P.2d 40 (1993).

B.
This Appellate Court Shall Directly Review the District Court's
Decision.
When the district court serves as an intermediate appella~e
court, this Court must review the decision of the district court
directly.

Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758

(2008); Bonner County v. Kootenai Hosp. Dist.
145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008).

(In re Danie1 W.),

In Losser, the Idaho Supreme

Court clarified the standard of review when reviewing a decision
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity.

The

Supreme Court determined that although for decades it had been
directly reviewing the magistrate court's decision independently
of, but with due regard for, the district court's decision, the
structure of the Idaho appellate rules require the Court to
directly review the district court's decision and consider
whether the district court committed error.

Id.

With respect to

the magistrate's decision, this Court must review the
magistrate's findings to determine whether they are supported by

substantial and competent evidence and whether the decision was
correct as a matter of law.

Losser, 145 Idaho at 672, 183 P.3d

at 760 (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d
1137, 1139 (1981)) .
In Appellant's Brief, Marvin argues that the Memorandum
Decision of the district court is advisory only.
Brief, p. 22).

(Appellant's

However, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently

explained in Losser, this Court must directly review the decision
of the district court for error and must review the magistrate's
findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial
and competent evidence.

C.
The District Court Did Not Err When i t Vacated the Magistrate's
Decision on Child Support and Remanded for Consideration of
Whether an Occupancy Expense Falls Within the Definition of
Reasonable and Ordinary Business Expense.
A child support award will not be disturbed on appeal absent
an abuse of discretion.
P.2d 118, 121 (1995).

Noble v. Fisher, 126 Idaho 885, 888, 894
A magistrate will be found to have abused

its discretion if i t fails to give consideration to relevant
factual circumstances or if its findings are not supported by the
evidence.
App. 1994).

Rohr v. Rohr, 126 Idaho 1, 3, 878 P.2d 175, 177 (Ct.
The magistrate's findings are supported by the

evidence if the evidence on which i t relies is substantial and

competent.

Id.

The district court acknowledged the magistrate's findings
and conclusions but found that the magistrate's decision should
be vacated because the magistrate failed to give consideration to
relevant factual circumstances.

The district court recognized

that the difference in income between the amount Marvin alleged
and the amount Susan set forth by historical evidence revolved
around the fact that Marvin completed construction of an office
building which was encumbered by a mortgage of $2,200,000.00 and
that Marvin used income from one of his business entities for
debt service on the $2.2 million dollar mortgage rather than
distributing i t as income.
The district court correctly referenced the child support
guidelines, I.R.C.P. 6(c).

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure,

6(0) (6), also referred to as the Idaho Child Support Guidelines,
applies to the determination of each parties' child support
obligation.

The Idaho Child Support Guidelines define gross

income as follows:
Gross income includes income from any source,
and includes, but is not limited to, income
from salaries, wages, commissions, bonuses,
dividends, pensions, interest, trust income,
annuities, social security benefits, workers'
compensation benefits, unemployment insurance
benefits, disability insurance benefits,
alimony, maintenance, any veteran's benefits
received, education grants, scholarships,
other financial aid and disability and
retirement payments to or on behalf of a

child calculated per section 11. The court
may consider when and for what duration the
receipt of funds from gifts, prizes, net
proceeds from property sales, severance pay,
and judgments will be considered as available
for child support. Benefits received from
public assistance programs for the parent
shall be included except in cases of
extraordinary hardship. Child support
received is assumed to be spent on the child
and is not income of the parent.
I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section 6(a) (1) (i)

(emphasis added).

In analyzing Marvin's income, the magistrate found that
although Marvin's income averaged $338,629 in years 2005, 2004,
and 2003, his income had decreased in 2006 to $140,339.

42-44).

(R. pp.

The magistrate explained this decrease in income by

stating that monies generated by two of Marvin's companies, MST
and MS, which had previously been used to pay Marvin, were now
required to be paid to Montoya Enterprises as rent and that the
rent was being used to service a mortgage on an office building.
(R. p.

43).

It was undisputed at trial that the commission income paid
to MST was still being earned and collected.

It was also

undisputed that the commission income which had previously been
paid to Marvin directly was now being used to pay "rent" to
Montoya Enterprises for an office building owned by Marvin
himself.
The magistrate focused on the fact that the construction of
the office building was completed approximately six months prior

to the divorce action being filed.

(R. p. 43).

However,

Marvin's accountant testified that January 2006 was the first
time rent was paid in that fashion.

(Tr. p. 168, L. 21 - L. 23).

That change occurred one month prior to Susan filing for divorce
in February, 2006.

Despite evidence that the rent did not

increase to $20,000 until January 2006, Marvin's accountant
testified that the monthly payment on the building debt
(including interest and principal) was an expense that began in
June of 20Q5 when the construction loan turned to a term loan.
(Tr. p. 135, L. 2 - L. 11).

(Tr. p. 133, L. 5 - L. 11).

This

is why "income and expenses from self-employment or operation of
a business must be closely reviewed to determine the level of
gross income of a parent to satisfy a child support obligation.
I.C.S.G. Section 6(a) (2).
Marvin continued to receive commission income from MST
through the entire year of 2005 consistent with commission income
from previous years.'

See Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.

The

magistrate asked if the expense of $17,689 in rent began after
June of 2005, "what was the source of Mr. Montoya's commission
income in 2005 that shows up on his tax return?"
12 - L. 14).

The question was never answered.

(Tr. p. 135, L.
The magistrate

did not perform a careful review.

In 2005, Marvin received commissions in the amount of
$165,296.
See Plaintiff's Exhibit 19.

Rather than MST issuing a check directly to Marvin, as it
had done previously, MST paid the commissions to MS which paid
Marvin's other company, Montoya Enterprises under the guise of
rent.

The commissions remained income for child support purposes

whether they were being paid directly to Marvin or merely
transferred into his solely owned asset.

Because the magistrate

ignored this evidence and did not carefully review the expense,
the district court correctly remanded the case for the magistrate
to follow Section (a) (2) of the Idaho Child Supp9rt Guidelines.
The purpose of the Idaho Child Support Guidelines is to
ensure parents properly support their children in accordance with
their income.

The magistrate's analysis was missing an

evaluation of whether servicing the $2.2 million dollar mortgage
was a "necessary and reasonable" business expense given the past
method and amount of payment.

The district court further stated

that money being paid in excess of that reasonable to the
business, or which reduces the debt and enhances Marvin's
property should not be "applied to reduce [Marvin's] income for
purposes of child support determination." (R. p. 71).

The

magistrate did not conduct an analysis at all of Marvin's alleged
expenses for the operation of his business.
The Idaho Child Support Guidelines define rents and business
income, in pertinent part, as follows:
For rents, royalties, or income derived from

a trade or business (whether carried on as a
sole proprietorship, partnership, or closely
held corporation), gross income is defined as
gross receipts minus ordinary and necessary
expenses required to carry on the trade or
business or to earn rents and royalties.
Excluded from ordinary and necessary expenses
under these Guidelines are expenses
determined by the court to be inappropriate
for determining gross income for purposes of
calculating child support. In general, income
and expenses from self-employment or
operation of a business should be carefully
reviewed to determine the level of gross
income of the parent to satisfy a child
support obligation. This amount may differ
from a determination of business income for
tax purposes.
I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section 6(a) (2)

(emphasis added).

Income for

the self-employed parent may differ from a determination of
business income for tax purposes.

Nobie, 126 Idaho at 855, 894

P.2d at 118.
Prior to MST and MS occupying the office building owned by
Marvin, the entities paid rent each month of, according to Mr.
Veloz, approximately $6,000.

(Tr. p. 127, L. 8 - L. 11).

One

month after the divorce is filed, voi1a!, the entities begin
paying rent of $20,000 per month.

The rent paid by the entities

would normally be an ordinary and necessary expense required to
carry on the business as referred to in Section 6(a) (2) of Rule 6
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

However, Marvin then

chose to pay rent three times that of his prior rent expense.
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Additionally, rent is also considered income pursuant to the
Idaho Child Support Guidelines.
6(a) (2).

See I.R.C.P. 6(c) (6), Section

Thus, any rent paid to Montoya Enterprises is income to

Marvin regardless of the fact that MST paid money to Montoya
Enterprises rather than to Marvin himself in the form of
commissions.

Additionally, as the mortgage of the office

building is paid each month, Marvin's net worth increases with
each principal reduction, providing that the property holds its
value.
In Chancller v. Chancller, 136 Idaho 246, 32 P.3d 140 (2001)
the Idaho Supreme Court reviewed a magistrate's calculation of
income for child support purposes.

The father in that case was

self-employed and the lower court relied on financial records of
the company the father owned to determine the father's income.
The financial records indicated that the father received $5,417
per month in income.

The lower court determined that for child

support purposes, the father's income was approximately $65,000
per year plus some "perks" consisting of tip and rental income.
The lower court found that these "perks" provided the father with
"additional means to discharge personal debt and pay support."

Id. at 252, 32 P.3d at 146.

However, the lower court did not

include any of the income from the "perks" in reaching its

RESPONDENT/CROSS-APPELLANT'S BRIEF - PaaA ?0

conclusion about the father's income.

On appeal, the Supreme

Court held that the "perks" had to be included as additional
income to the father and that the father's income needed to be
recalculated to include those amounts.
The instant case is similar.

Although Marvin re-labeled his

commissions as an expense, the fact is that the commissions, or a
portion thereof, are being used to pay rent to Marvin.

Marvin's

choice to pay rent to discharge his own personal debt and
increase his equity does not exclude i t as income for child
support purposes.
Rent is considered income pursuant to the Idaho Child
Support Guidelines and the magistrate ignored the rent earned by
Marvin when determining Marvin's income.

Evidence at trial

revealed that Marvin received commission income sufficient to
exceed his monthly mortgage payment and that for a period of
seven months, from January to July 2006, there was a net income
of $19,958.45.

(Tr. p. 168, L. 3 - L. 19).

Said sum, which was

only from a period of seven months, is in addition to the
increase of equity in the building and the discharge of Marvin's
personal debt as the loan principal was decreased.

Testimony was

presented that the office building, although not yet fully
occupied, was occupied by other tenants in addition to MS and MST
and that Marvin was receiving rent from these tenants.
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(Tr. p.

97, L. 19 - L. 20).

Marvin built an office building with space

greater than his needs but then placed the entire cost of that
building against his income.
The district court recognized that the magistrate failed to
carefully review Marvin's income and expenses from business which
caused child support to be set artificially low.

The district

court did not err in remanding the case for consideration of
these business expenses.
Marvin argues that the district court's conclusions are
flawed.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 27).

First, Marvin attempts to

distinguish the income and expenses earned and paid by his
companies from his own personal income and expenses.

However,

the two are not distinguishable because Marvin is the sole owner
of his companies and thus income to the companies equates to
income to Marvin.

Marvin made the decision to have his company

service the $2.2 million dollar debt, even though the company was
paying for "extra" space intended for lease to third parties.
Marvin attempts to support his argument by stating that if
Marvin's company had not been charged with servicing the debt, he
would have to personally pay the debt and thus the expense would
still be a factor in the determination of Marvin's income for
child support purposes.
inaccurate.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 28).

This is

The Idaho Child Support Guidelines do not allow for

an individual's income to be adjusted or reduced because he or

she incurs debt even if as an investment. 2
remain the same.

Marvin's income would

Susan has not and does not argue that Marvin's

income should only be based upon the activities of two of
Marvin' s businesse.s.

Marvin should not, however, be able to

reduce his income for child support purposes by making an
investment in a building, which will, as payments of the mortgage
are made, increase his net worth.
Since the magistrate failed to give consideration to all
relevant factual circumstances, the district court did not err in
vacating the magistrate's decision and remanding for further
consideration.
D.
The District Court Did Not Err in Deferring the Issue of Attorney
Fees to the Magistrate.
Marvin argues that the district court "articulated no basis
for an award of attorney fees to Susan."
31).

(Appellant's Brief, p.

The district court neither awarded nor denied a request for

attorney fees.
after remand.

It simply deferred the decision to the magistrate
This cannot be considered error.

2

For example, per Rule 6 (c) (6), Section 4 (b) of the Idaho
Child Support Guidelines, "child support shall be given priority
over the needs of.
. creditors in allocating family
resources." Similarly, net proceeds from the sale of an asset
can be considered a resource for child support purposes, Section
6(a) (1), and under-producing assets may be assessed reasonable
monetary value so .that there is an adequate award of child
s1mnort.

SAA
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E.
Marvin is Not Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal.
Marvin seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. § 12121 and I.A.R. 41.

Section 12-121 permits an award of attorney

fees in a civil action to the prevailing party if the court
determines that the case was brought, pursued or defended
frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation.

Ba1derson v.

Ba1derson, 1.27 Idaho 48, 54, 896 P.2d 956, 962 (1995).
The instant case is based upon the unreasonable efforts
Marvin made to reduce his child support obligation.

Susan was

the prevailing party on appeal to the district court and thus her
actions cannot be categorized as frivolous or unreasonable.
Susan is merely attempting to secure proper child support that
should have been awarded for her children.

F.
Susan is Entitled to Costs and Attorney Fees on Appeal and Below.
Susan seeks an award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to
I.e.§§ 12-121 and 32-704, as well as I.A.R. 41.

As previously

stated, section 12-121 permits an award of attorney fees in a
civil action to the prevailing party if the court determines that
the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.

Ba1derson, 127 Idaho at 54,

896 P.2d at 962.
Marvin has, starting with the motion for a temporary child
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support award and throughout the proceedings, taken an
unreasonable position and attempted to manipulate his cash flow
to decrease his gross income for child support purposes.
Marvin threw several unfounded accusations at Susan throughout
the trial.

For example, he alleged that she suffered from

postpartum depression and other mental illnesses, when tests
showed otherwise.

Marvin compared Susan, in a sworn affidavit,

to Andrea Yates, the mother who killed her children.

Marvin

accused Susan, in open court, of using methamphetamine.

Marvin

filed frivolous motions causing Susan to incur substantial
attorney fees to defend herself.

Susan should be awarded costs

and attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121.
Additionally, a court may, after considering the financial
resources of both parties and the factors set forth. in
I.C. § 32-705, "order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the
cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any
proceeding under this act and for attorney's fees, including sums
for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the
commencement of the proceedings or after the entry of judgment."
I.C. § 32-704(3).
The Idaho Court of Appeals held in Stephens v. Stephens, 138
Idaho 195, 61 P.3d 63 (Ct. App. 2002), .that a disparity in income
between the parties is generally sufficient to justify an award
of attorney fees under I.e.§ 32-704(3).

The magistrate found that at the time of trial, Susan was
employed at Hawley Troxell Ennis

&

Hawley, LLP, as a full time

office manager earning $93,000 a year.

Susan's income is not

disputed on appeal.
The magistrate characterized Marvin's income as "hotly
contested" and concluded that Marvin's income from selfemployment was $140,339 a year.

At trial, Susan presented

evidence, based upon the parties' tax returns, of Marvin's
historical income, which averaged $338,629 for years 2005, 2004,
and 2003.

Marvin does not argue that his income is less than

$140,339 per year.

Thus, clearly Marvin earns a significantly

greater income than Susan and has greater resources to pay
attorney fees.
Susan has been forced to expend considerable costs and legal
fees at the trial level as well as on appeal merely to secure a
proper child support award for the parties' children.

Child

support payments are intended for the benefit of the children.

AJ.ber v. AJ.ber, 93 Idaho 755, 758, 472 P.2d 321, 324 (1970).
Moreover, courts have recognized as public policy that to protect
the best interests of the children, a parent should have the
ability to have his or her day in court to secure a proper child
support award.

See Burke v. Burke, 96 Wn. App. 474, 980 P.2d 265

(Wash. App. Ct. 1999).

A parent should not be frozen out of

litigation affecting proper support for the welfare of the

children, due to the inability to pay attorney fees as they
accrue.

Id.

Susan does not have sufficient resources with which to pay
her attorneys fees and costs in this matter and Marvin has
significantly greater resources than Susan.

Therefore, based

upon the disparity in income and assets between the parties, this
Court should award Susan reasonable costs and attorney fees at
trial and on appeal.

G.
The Magistrate Abused its Discretion in Denying Susan's Motion
for Attorney Fees.
After the district court's appellate decision was issued,
the case remanded, and Marvin appealed to this court, Susan
sought attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 32-704.

Susan argued

that due to the disparity in income between Susan and Marvin and
the fact that Susan did not have the resources available to pay
her attorney fees, Susan should be awarded attorney fees.
objected to the award of fees on several grounds. 3
20-27).

Marvin

{Supp. R. pp.

In addition, both parties filed supporting affidavits.

{Supp. R. pp. 28-37).

3

Initially, Marvin argued that the motion for attorney fees
was pre-mature.
The magistrate correctly concluded at the
hearing that under section 32-704, the motion was not prematurely
brought.
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Section 32-704 allows a court to award attorney fees after
considering the financial resources of both parties and the
factors set forth in I.C. § 32-705.

Section 32-705 lists five

factors the court may consider including the financial resources
of the spouse seeking maintenance and the marital property
apportioned to said spouse.
At hearing, Susan again reiterated the disparity between the
parties' incomes.

Even using Marvin's artificially low income of

$140,000, there is a disparity of almost $50,000.

Moreover, it

was established at trial that there was a great disparity in net
worth or the assets of the parties.

Susan testified that she had

retirement in the amount of approximately $94,000 and
approximately $66,000 in equity in her home.
p. 39, L. 2).

On the other hand Marvin's net worth was

established at over $3.8 million dollars.
21).

(Tr. p. 38, L. 3 -

(Tr. p. 39, L. 17 - L.

See Exhibit 52A.

The magistrate found that the difference between $140,000
income versus $93,000 was not significant enough such that
attorney fees should be awarded.
- p. 25, L. 25).

(Tr. Cross~Appeal p. 24, L. 22

The magistrate failed to consider, however, the

disparity in the parties' net worth as is one of the factors
listed under Section 32-705.

The magistrate stated that even if

i t determined Marvin's income was greater than $140,000, the
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difference in child support would not be sufficient to cover the
fees Susan had expended.

In relying on this hypothetical, the

magistrate appeared to blame Susan for not being in a position to
afford the legal fees.

However, whether Susan has been forced to

expend attorney fees in an amount greater than the child support
figure used in the magistrate's hypothetical is irrelevant.

The

magistrate abused its discretion in denying Susan's motion for
attorney fees.
IV.
CONCLUSION
The district court did not err when it vacated the
magistrate's decision and remanded for consideration of whether
an occupancy expense falls within the definition of reasonable
and ordinary business expense.

Additionally, i t is not err in

deferring the issue of attorney fees to the magistrate.

Finally,

the magistrate abused its discretion when it denied Susan's
request for attorney fees.

Susan should be awarded attorney fees

on appeal and below pursuant to I.C. §§ 32-704 and 12-121.
DATED this

1it1>-

day of January, 2009.
BEVIS, THIRY & SCHINDELE, P.A.
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